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Taking stock of how we procure trains

Rail Value for Money study

In Sir Roy McNulty’s Rail Value for Money study in 2011, concerns were expressed about poor productivity resulting from the many types of rolling stock in use, with the inference that standardisation could reduce costs.

The main reason for the diversity in equipment is not poor quality strategy, rather the policy of competitive tendering. This broke the model of a railway that had been based on integrated workshops where there was design evolution, rather than starting with a blank piece of paper.

Having said that, the different manufacturers have provided much needed innovation, while there has also been much change in the requirements of technical and environmental standards. The examples here include the judgement that greater crashworthiness is justified, that running gear should be designed to reduce track wear and that emissions must be curtailed.

The era of competitive tendering has seen the emergence of standard types - Turbostar and Electrostar trains from Bombardier, the Siemens family of Desiro units, and more recently the present and future Hitachi equipment.

One legitimate criticism is the operational difficulty caused by the use of different coupling systems. This has resulted in severe delays when the need arises for failed trains to be assisted by a following service where couplers are not compatible.

Standardisation of rolling stock

When British Railways was established after nationalisation in 1948, there was a belief that standardisation could reduce operating costs, although there were many constraints in the post-war economy, such as steel being in short supply. It was not until 1951 that the first of the steel-bodied Mk 1 standard vehicles appeared, and restrictions in the allocation of steel for railway purposes meant deliveries were far below that expected.

The procurement process as such was that the Railway Executive made an annual bid for its allocation of steel and investment funding from the Treasury. Passenger coach construction fared badly because other industries had priority (electricity generation, for example), and within the railway budget the urgent need to replace obsolete water coal wagons with standard 16-ton 4W vehicles was judged more important.

For the coaches, a standard gauge restriction had been established that resulted in a vehicle body that was 63ft 6in (19.36 metres) in length with a maximum width of 9ft (2.74 metres). To overcome restrictions where there was significant curvature, there was also a standard length of 57ft (17.37 metres) that was used for rolling stock intended for suburban routes.

The frames and running gear adopted the best practices of the pre-Nationalisation ‘Big Four’ companies. Vacuum brakes and steam heating were retained, despite development of pressure-heated and ventilated rolling stock by the London & North Eastern Railway (LNER). The judgement was that low construction costs should be the priority over higher amenity standards, because revenue opportunities were threatened by the growth in private road transport.

By the mid-1950s the steel shortage had eased and a policy of deregulation combined with national economic growth allowed greater investment funds to be made available, which led to the railway modernisation programme of 1955. Electrification plans were now favoured, although in 1957 there was an attempt to improve the standard Mk 1 coach design that was very much an austerity product.

There had been continuing doubts as to whether investment in higher quality coaches would bring increased revenue, but evidence was growing that this would indeed prove to be the case, as the services provided on main line routes improved following the introduction of diesel traction and higher track speeds.

The effect of an objective to provide a better journey experience led to BR launching an experimental train: described as XP64, it was refined to form the Mk 2 standard design that went into production in 1964. Later variants of this type were fully air-conditioned.

The Mk 2 design resolved the severe corrosion issues experienced with the Mk 1 type, where the base of the body was joined to the underframe, by substituting an integral construction. There was a small increase in length to 64ft 6in (19.66 metres), and close to 1,900 vehicles were built by BR at Derby. Construction ended in 1975 as the next generation of Mk 3 vehicles began delivery.

A substantial fleet of electric multiple units was built to the Mk 1 design, which at the time of its introduction had superior crashworthiness characteristics than earlier types, that were often of wooden construction. The Clapham accident in 1988 showed that in the worst circumstances the coaches represented a collision damage risk, but the subsequent inquiry found that they were not inherently unsafe and continued operation was permitted.

It was not until 2002 that the safety authority, the Health & Safety Executive, judged that operations by slam-door Mk 1-type coaches could not continue after the end of 2004, given the improved protection now offered by more modern vehicles in the event of a collision.

Despite their longevity, Mk 1 coaches remain popular for charter travel, where the advent of the Train Protection and Warning System has reduced collision risk and allowed the vehicles to remain in use. Many Mk 2 vehicles that are less favoured for charter work, because they are air-conditioned and require more modern traction to be used for haulage, have been exported. More than 140 of these coaches are now in use in New Zealand, for example.

Evolution to High Speed operation

It is remarkable that the Mk 3 BR carriage design conceived more than 40 years ago as a standard vehicle for 125mph operation, whether in the fixed formation High Speed Trains or for conventional locomotive haulage, remains at the forefront of the product offered by long-distance operators today.

And the Mk 3 is destined to remain in service for at least another decade, given the decision by Abellio to refurbish a substantial number of IC 125 trainsets for use on ScotRail inter-urban services in the years to 2025.

These vehicles represent the swansong of the BR era, whereby vehicles were specified, designed, built and paid for within an integrated organisation and where procurement decisions remained based on application for financial authority from the Government.

The main characteristic that differentiated the Mk 3 from earlier types was the length of the coach - 75ft (23 metres). Although it was always intended that the vehicles would be confined to the more important long-distance routes over time, the dimensions have not proved unduly restrictive in terms of geographic availability.

And the popularity of the type is a reflection of their excellent ride, which is due to the use of hydraulic dampers in addition to their coil-spring primary suspension. Production continued until 1988 and a lower-speed shortened version was used for large numbers of electric units.

It can thus be seen that there was a continued lineage between 1951 and 1988, as the first Mk 2 vehicles were operated within Mk 1 rolling stock formations and had compatible draw gear. As the newer vehicles were developed with air brakes, operational compatibility was maintained by converting Mk 1 coaches with air brakes.

Similarly, as Mk 3 vehicles came into production they could be marshalled with Mk 2s, as there was draw gear and electrical compatibility, although the High Speed Train fleet was conceived as a standalone formation and did not have electrical compatibility with the earlier vehicles of the type built for locomotive-hauled operations.

For the rolling stock required in the late 1980s for the East Coast Main Line electrification, very different protocols were in force.

It had been decided in 1983 that vehicle requirements would become part of a competitive tendering process, in the belief that this would be a spur to reduced prices and greater manufacturing efficiency. This resulted in a move away from consistency with previous standards and by 1987 private sector contractors had secured more than 50% of rolling stock construction orders, with the workshops owned by BR now managed as a distinct subsidiary.

This led to the decision to sell the six British Rail Engineering Limited workshops that were involved in new construction at Crewe, Derby, York, Doncaster (wagon works), Horwich (foundry) and Swindon. Only Derby (owned by Bombardier) now remains in the rolling stock construction business.

The contract to construct the East Coast vehicles that were designated Mk 4 was awarded to Metro-Cammell and 314 vehicles were built between 1989 and 1992. The original specification required 140mph running with an ability to tilt by up to 6%, and as a result Swiss SIG BT41 bogies were selected, rather than a BREL design that would have continued the ride characteristics associated with the Mk 3 vehicles.

When introduced, the ride of coaches proved to be inferior to the Mk 3 and so modifications were made to the suspension system, in particular to improve damping between the vehicles. Disabled access was another priority of the design, so the door entrances were enlarged to allow a more generous turning circle for a wheelchair. The vestibule environment was improved with carpeted walls, better lighting, sealed gangways and carriage doors.

The trains will have a shorter life than the HSTs they replaced, unless owner Eversholt Rail can refresh the product for use in other suitable operating environments when their ECML working lives end with the introduction of Hitachi’s IEP.

Replacement High Speed Trains

After three decades of service since 1976, the need for HST replacement was apparent, at least a decade ago, although the trains remained popular in terms of the product offered.

Initially it was seen as providing what could be described as HST2 - but the urgency went out of the project when the overhaul of power cars with new MTU engines took place (although East Midlands Trains opted for the Paxman V185 power pack in its engine replacement programme). It was also realised that the popular Mk 3 coaches could be retained in service, although ultimately modification would be required to improve accessibility and to install controlled emission toilets.

In the breathing space created before a replacement decision was needed, the project was taken over by the DfT, during a period when the Government was exercising more direct control over not only franchised operations but also rolling stock procurement. The notion of developing a replacement diesel-powered HST was dropped in favour of a wider initiative described as the Intercity Express Programme.

Decisions had to be made about whether the trains should use distributed power with below-floor engines in place of power cars - the decision to adopt this form of traction reflects the greater number of passengers that can be conveyed in a given length of train.

The Government also sought to fulfil a high-level objective to create a new assembly plant where the trains could be built. It achieved this by awarding the contract to Agility Trains, a consortium that includes Hitachi, which is building a new train assembly facility at Newton Aycliffe, in County Durham. It also moved away from financing by the ROSCOs, in an attempt to widen the competitive nature of the market in rail finance by specifying in the procurement process that the manufacturer must organise the finance required to build the fleet.

This turned out to be the source of considerable delay - while the nature of the investment risk is understood by the ROSCOs, that has not necessarily been the case for other sources of funds. As a result, there is little likelihood that financing costs will be reduced.

While the make-up of the order for what is now known as the Hitachi Super Express was debated, the Government decided to embark on a major programme of electrification, as part of a job creation exercise to mitigate the effect that the banking crisis of 2008 had on national economic output.

As a result, the IEP trains will have a much greater element of electric trainsets, although bi-mode units will be equipped with the capability to reach destinations that are not located on the electrified network.